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a b s t r a c t 
The NIS Directive is the first horizontal legislation undertaken at EU level for the protection 
of network and information systems across the Union. During the last decades e-services, 
new technologies, information systems and networks have become embedded in our daily 
lives. It is by now common knowledge that deliberate incidents causing disruption of IT 
services and critical infrastructures constitute a serious threat to their operation and con- 
sequently to the functioning of the Internal Market and the Union. This paper first discusses 
the Directive’s addressees particularly with regard to their compliance obligations as well as 
Member States’ obligations as regards their respective national strategies and cooperation 
at EU level. Subsequently, the critical role of ENISA in implementing the Directive, as rein- 
forced by the proposal for a new Regulation on ENISA (the EU Cybersecurity Act), is brought 
forward, before elaborating upon the, inevitable, relationship of the NIS Directive with EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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onsequently to the functioning of the Internal Market and 
he Union.2 This risk, combined with the fact that existing 
ounter-measures in terms of security tools and procedures 
re not sufficiently developed in the EU, and certainly not com- 
on in all Member States, made the need for a comprehensive 
pproach at Union level, concerning the security of network 
nd information systems, unquestionable. The NIS Directive 
ims to address this need by putting forward “the measures 
ith a view to achieving a high common level of security of net- 
ork and information systems within the Union so as to improve 
he functioning of the internal market”. 3 
The NIS Directive was published in July 2016, however the 
U has been addressing cyber security issues in a comprehen- 
ive manner since 2004, when ENISA (European Union Agency 
or Network and Information Security),4 a new specialised EU 
gency, was founded. The NIS Directive itself has its roots in 
he Commission’s Communication of 2009, which focuses on 
revention and awareness and defines a plan of immediate 
ction to strengthen the security and trust in the informa- 
ion society.5 This was followed, in 2013, by a joint Commu- 
ication released by the Commission and the High Represen- 
ative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 
he Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union.6 From 2013 
o 2015 the Commission, the Council and the Parliament dis- 
ussed the draft put forward by the Commission intensely and 
hese discussions resulted in the NIS Directive that entered 
nto force in August 2016. The deadline for national transpo- 
ition by the EU Member States was the 9th of May, 2018.7 , 8 
The NIS Directive consists of 27 articles. Articles 1–6 set its 
cope and main definitions, including a further clarification 
egarding the identification of operators of essential services 
article 5), as well as the meaning of significant disruptive ef- 
ect (article 6). Articles 7–10 describe the national frameworks 
hat need to be adopted by each Member State on the security 
f network and information systems. These frameworks in- 
lude, among others, Member States’ obligation to introduce 
 national strategy and to designate national competent au- 
horities (including a single point of contract and the com- 
uter security incident response teams (CSIRTs), as well as,2 For cyber-crime statistics see Carrapico H./Farrand B. in Cyber- 
rime as a fragmented policy field in the context of the area of freedom, 
ecurity and justice , in Ripoll Servent A./Trauner F. (Eds.), Routledge 
andbook on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Routledge, 
018. 
3 See article 1 of the NIS Directive. 
4 See https://www.ENISA.europa.eu/ . 
5 See Communication from the Commission to the European 
arliament the Council the European Economic and Social Com- 
ittee and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Informa- 
ion Infrastructure Protection “Protecting Europe from large-scale 
yber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security 
nd resilience (COM (2009)149). 
6 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council 
he European Economic and Social Committee and the Com- 
ittee of the regions, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European 
nion: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (available at 
ttp://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu- cyber- security/ 
ybsec _ comm _ en.pdf). 
7 See article 25 of the Directive (transposition). 
8 At the time of drafting this paper the majority of Member 
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nism is provided in Chapter III and more specifically in ar- 
icles 11–13. The articles that follow (14–18) define the secu- 
ity requirements and incident notification for operators of 
ssential services and digital service providers, respectively.
he adoption of standards and the process of voluntary no- 
ification are dealt with in articles 19 and 20. Finally articles 
1–27 include the Directive’s final provisions. 
In terms of structure, this article is divided into seven chap- 
ers: the first three chapters discuss the Directive’s affected 
arties and their obligations under its provisions, chapters 
our and five set Member States’ obligations as regards na- 
ional strategy, as well as cooperation at EU level, whereas the 
ritical role of ENISA in implementing the Directive, as this is 
einforced by the proposal for a new Regulation on ENISA (the 
U Cybersecurity Act),9 is presented in chapter 6. Finally, the,
nevitable, relationship of the Directive with EU’s General Data 
rotection Regulation 10 are established in the final chapter 7. 
. Operators of essential services (first target 
f the NIS Directive) 
.1. Definition: an Annex approach 
he NIS Directive affects two categories of undertakings, un- 
er an admittedly differentiated approach in terms of obliga- 
ions placed upon each one of them: operators of essential 
ervices and digital service providers.11 Their definitions are 
ncluded in article 4 and consist of a combination of articles 
f this Directive 12 and its annexes, as well as Directive (EU) 
015/1535.13 With regard to the first category, that is operators 
f essential services, their definition includes a public or pri- 
ate entity that activates in specific sectors, such as the sector 
f energy, transport, banking and health,14 and which at the 
ame time meets some essential criteria that qualify it as an 
ntity of such type.15 Consequently, not all operators of essen- 
ial services fall within the scope of the NIS Directive. Member 9 See https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/ 
uri=CELEX:52017PC0477&from=EN . 
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons 
ith regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
ovement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
ata Protection Regulation). 
11 On identifying the entities under cyber security obligations see 
lso Kulesza J. in Defining Cybersecurity-Cybersecurity and Critical In- 
rastructure, the Actors, in Kulesza J./Balleste R. (Eds.) Cybersecurity 
nd human rights in the age of cyberveilance , Rowman & Littlefield, 
016. 
12 See article 4(2) on the definition of digital service and article 
(2) on the criteria an operator of essential services should meet. 
13 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the 
ouncil of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the pro- 
ision of information in the field of technical regulations and of 
ules on Information Society services. 
14 For the full list of sectors and sub-sectors see Annex II of the 
IS Directive and Section 1(a) of this paper. 
15 See article 5(2) of the NIS Directive: (a) an entity that provides 
 service which is essential for the maintenance of critical soci- 
tal and/or economic activities; (b) the provision of that service 
epends on network and information systems; and (c) an incident 
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States are tasked with the process of their categorisation and
identification as such, as this is described in detail below. 
In the event of sector specific Union legal acts, Member
States should apply that legislation, as long as it contains re-
quirements that are, at least, equivalent to the ones of the
NIS Directive. Some examples include operators in the wa-
ter transport sector,16 undertakings providing public commu-
nication networks or publicly available communications ser-
vices,17 trust services providers,18 as well as the sectors of
banking and financial markets.19 
We saw that operators of essential services include any pri-
vate or public entity that meet specific criteria and at the same
time are of the types included in Annex II of the NIS Directive.
All entities that fall within this definition, should comply with
the security and notification requirements included in the Di-
rective. Annex II includes a list of the sectors and subsectors,
as well as types of entities that are categorised as operators
of essential services.20 Once an entity is categorised as one
of the types listed in the Annex, the next step lies with the
Member States, who are responsible to carry out an identifica-
tion process, in order to determine which individual compa-
nies meet the additional criteria of the definition of operators
of essential services. To this end, the NIS Directive requires
Member States to adopt national measures as a result of the
identification process, in order to determine these entities.21 would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of that 
service. 
16 See recital 11 of the NIS Directive where it is clarified that Mem- 
ber States, when identifying operators in the water transport sec- 
tor, should take into consideration international codes and guide- 
lines developed by the Maritime Organisations, as well as article 1 
(7) of the Directive. 
17 See Framework Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services 
and the security requirements provided therein. 
18 See Regulation 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust 
services for electronic transactions in the Internal market and re- 
pealing Directive 1999/93/EC and the security requirements pro- 
vided therein. 
19 See recital 12 of the NIS Directive: “Regulation and supervi- 
sion in the sectors of banking and financial market infrastructures 
is highly harmonised at Union level, through the use of primary 
and secondary Union law and standards developed together with 
the European supervisory authorities. Within the banking union, 
the application and the supervision of those requirements are en- 
sured by the single supervisory mechanism. For Member States 
that are not part of the banking union, this is ensured by the rele- 
vant banking regulators of Member States. In other areas of finan- 
cial sector regulation, the European System of Financial Supervi- 
sion also ensures a high degree of commonality and convergence 
in supervisory practices. The European Securities Markets Author- 
ity also plays a direct supervision role for certain entities, namely 
credit-rating agencies and trade repositories”. 
20 In particular the following sectors and subsectors are listed: 
energy (electricity, oil and gas), transport (air, rail, water and road), 
banking (credit institutions, financial market infrastructures (trad- 
ing venues, central counterparties), health (healthcare providers, 
including hospitals and private clinics), water (drinking water sup- 
ply and distribution), and digital infrastructure (internet exchange 
points, domain name system service providers, top level domain 
names registries). 
21 See also recital 25 of the NIS Directive that reads as follows: 
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the operators of essential services with an establishment on
their territory for each sector and subsector referred to in the
Annex.22 This list of identified operators of essential services
shall be updated by Member States at least every two years af-
ter May 9, 2018 in order to ensure that possible changes in the
market are accurately reflected. Taking into account the mini-
mum harmonisation requirement in article 3 of the Directive,
Member States can adopt legislation ensuring a higher level
of security. In this regard, Member States may expand the se-
curity and notification obligations provided for operators of
essential services to entities belonging to other sectors and
sub-sectors than those listed in the Annex of the NIS Direc-
tive. Accordingly, several additional sectors, not mentioned in
the Annex, have been brought to the table by different Mem-
ber States, including among others, public administrations,
the postal sector, the food sector, the chemical and nuclear
industry, the environmental sector and civil protection.23 
2.2. Security requirements (art. 14 par. 1 and 2 of the 
NIS Directive) 
Pursuant to article 14 (1) of the NIS Directive, Member States
are required to ensure that operators of essential services
take appropriate measures, technical and organisational, to
manage the risks posed to the security of the network and
information systems they use. In accordance with article 14
(2), appropriate measures shall prevent and minimise the im-
pact of incidents affecting the security of their systems. Main
objective should be to ensure continuity of such services. How
could a common perspective by all Member States be achieved
though, as far as these security requirements are concerned?
It is well understood that the Directive sets the general
obligation for Member States to adopt a national strategy on
this subject, however the specific approach to the national
transposition of article 14 (1) of the Directive rests with each
Member State. In order however for the national provisions
on security requirements to be aligned to the greatest extent
possible, the Commission encourages Member States to
follow the guidance document developed by the Cooperation
Group.24 In this document the Cooperation Group lays downadopt national measures to determine which entities are subject 
to obligations regarding the security of network and information 
systems. This result could be achieved by adopting a list enumer- 
ating all operators of essential services or by adopting national 
measures including objective quantifiable criteria, such as the out- 
put of the operator or the number of users, which make it possi- 
ble to determine which entities are subject to obligations regard- 
ing the security of network and information systems. The national 
measures, whether already existing or adopted in the context of 
this Directive, should include all legal measures, administrative 
measures and policies allowing for the identification of operators 
of essential services under this Directive”. 
22 See article 5 par. 1 of the NIS Directive. 
23 See Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council -Making the most of NIS – towards the 
effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and in- 
formation systems across the Union, COM (2017) 476. 
24 See Cooperation Group’s Reference document on security mea- 
sures for operators of essential services, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
digital- single- market/en/nis- cooperation- group . 
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28 See recital 48 of the NIS Directive that reads as follows: “the 
security, continuity and reliability of the type of digital services 
referred to in this Directive are of the essence for the smooth func- 
tioning of many businesses. A disruption of such a digital service 
could prevent the provision of other services which rely on it and 
could thus have an impact on key economic and societal activities 
in the Union. Such digital services might therefore be of crucial 
importance for the smooth functioning of businesses that depend 
on them and, moreover, for the participation of such businesses 
in the internal market and cross-border trade across the Union. 
Those digital service providers that are subject to this Directive are ome general principles that should be taken into considera- 
ion by all Member States during adopting security measures.
hese measures should be effective, tailored, compatible,
roportionate, concrete, verifiable and inclusive. 
.3. Notification requirements (art. 14 par. 3 and 4 of the 
IS Directive) 
he security requirements that need to be adopted by the op- 
rators of essential services are accompanied by another obli- 
ation that of notifying the competent authorities of any in- 
ident that has an impact on the continuity of the (essential) 
ervices an operator provides. Pursuant to article 14(3), Mem- 
er States have to ensure that operators of essential services 
otify “any incident having a significant impact on the continuity 
f the essential services”. Consequently, operators of essential 
ervices should not notify any minor incidents but only seri- 
us incidents affecting the continuity of the essential service.
rticle 14 par. 4 provides a list of parameters that should be 
aken into account, when determining the significance of the 
mpact of an incident, namely the number of users affected,
he duration of the incident and the geographical spread with 
egard to the area affected by the incident. Again, consistency 
n the national approaches, as far as the notification process 
s concerned, is of the essence. As in the case of security re- 
uirements, the Cooperation Group has published a reference 
ocument on this issue.25 
. Digital service providers (second target of 
he NIS Directive) 
.1. Definition: a catch all approach 
igital service providers are the second category of entities 
hat fall under the scope of the NIS Directive. Digital service 
roviders include any legal person that provides a digital ser- 
ice 26 and more specifically an online market place, an on- 
ine search engine, or a cloud computing service.27 Their reg- 
lation, as far as security and notification requirements are 25 See Reference document on Incident Notification for operators 
f essential services. https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single- market/ 
n/nis- cooperation- group . 
26 That is a service within the meaning of point (b) of article 1(1) 
f Directive (EU) 2015/1535, which is of a type listed in Annex III 
f the NIS Directive. Accordingly, Service means any Information 
ociety service, that is to say, any service normally provided for 
emuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the indi- 
idual request of a recipient of services. For the purposes of this 
efinition: (i) “at a distance” means that the service is provided 
ithout the parties being simultaneously present; (ii) “by elec- 
ronic means” means that the service is sent initially and received 
t its destination by means of electronic equipment for the pro- 
essing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and 
ntirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by 
ptical means or by other electromagnetic means; (iii) “at the indi- 
idual request of a recipient of services” means that the service is 
rovided through the transmission of data on individual request. 
27 The three types of services were chosen to be regulated due to 
he increasing number of businesses that fundamentally rely on 
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epend on these providers for the provision of their own ser- 
ices. Consequently, a disruption of the digital service could 
ave an impact on key economic and societal activities in the 
nion.28 It should be noted that, in comparison to the oper- 
tors of essential services, the NIS Directive does not require 
ember States to identify digital service providers, warrant- 
ng thus a catch-all approach. 
Three types of digital service providers fall under the 
cope of the NIS Directive: online market place providers,
nline search engine providers and cloud computing service 
roviders. An online marketplace denotes a digital service 29 
hat allows consumers and/or traders to conclude online ser- 
ices or service contracts with traders.30 An online search 
ngine is described as a digital service that allows users to per- 
orm searches of websites on the basis of a query on any sub-
ect.31 Finally, cloud computing service means, a digital service 
hat enables access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable 
omputing resources.32 
.2. Security requirements (art. 16 par. 1 and 2 of the 
IS Directive) 
he Directive describes, in its article 16, the security measures 
hat digital service providers should take in order to mitigate 
he risks that threaten the security of the network and infor- 
ation systems they use for the provision of their service. The 
ame article regulates the incident notification process digital hose that are considered to offer digital services on which many 
usinesses in the Union increasingly rely”. 
29 For the definition of digital service see footnote 13 above. 
30 See article 4(17) and recital 15 of the NIS Directive, as well as 
NISA’s Incident notification for DSPs in the context of the NIS 
irective. As per article 4(17) “online marketplace” means a digi- 
al service that allows consumers and/or traders as respectively 
efined in point (a) and in point (b) of article 4(1) of Directive 
013/11/EU of the European Parliaments and of the Council to con- 
lude online sales or service contracts with traders either on the 
nline marketplace’s website or on a trader’s website that uses 
omputing services provided by the online marketplace. 
31 See article 4(18) of the Directive and recital 16 of the NIS Direc- 
ive. As per article 4(18) online search engine means a digital ser- 
ice that allows users to perform searches of, in principle, all web- 
ites or websites in a particular language on the basis of a query 
n any subject in the form of a keyword, phrase or other input, 
nd returns links in which information related to the requested 
ontent can be found. 
32 See article 4(19) and also recital 17 of the NIS Directive. As per 
rticle 4(19) cloud computing service means a digital service that 
nables access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable comput- 
ng resources. 
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37 See article 16(4) of the NIS Directive. 
38 See recital 60 of the NIS Directive “Digital service providers 
should be subject to light-touch and reactive ex post supervisory 
activities justified by the nature of their services and operations. 
The competent authority concerned should therefore only take 
action when provided with evidence, for example by the digital 
service provider itself, by another competent authority, including 
a competent authority of another Member State, or by a user of 
the service, that a digital service provider is not complying with 
the requirements of this Directive, in particular following the oc- 
currence of an incident. The competent authority should therefore 
have no general obligation to supervise digital service providers”. service providers should follow in order to comply with the
provisions of the Directive. 
Article 16 (1) lists the elements that need to be taken into
account by a digital service provider when identifying and
adopting security measures for its network, that is: (a) the
security of the systems and facilities, (b) incident handling,
(c) business continuity management, (d) monitoring, audit-
ing and testing and (e) compliance with international stan-
dards. The Commission, by virtue of article 16(8) of the NIS
Directive,33 issued an Implementing Regulation 34 that speci-
fies further these elements.35 The need for an additional leg-
islative measure that clarifies the provisions of the NIS Direc-
tive, as far as the obligations of digital service providers are
concerned, was considered essential. The reason for that is
that digital service providers, contrary to operators of essen-
tial services, are free to take technical and organisational mea-
sures they consider appropriate and proportionate to manage
the risk posed to the security of their systems. To this end,
the guidelines and clarifications provided by the Implement-
ing Regulation contribute so that digital service providers in
the Union adopt, to the greatest extent possible, a common
approach when addressing this issue. 
3.3. Notification requirements (art. 16 par. 3 and 4 of the 
NIS Directive) 
Except for the security requirements mentioned above, in or-
der for a digital service provider to safeguard the security of
its network and information system, an incident notification
procedure should be followed. The obligation of digital service
providers to notify any incidents with a substantial impact on
the provision of their service is regulated under article 16 par. 3
and 4. In this context, Member States shall ensure that digital
service providers notify the competent authority or the CSIRT
(see below) of any incident with a substantial impact on the
provision of their service. Article 16 (4) mentions the param-
eters to be taken into account in order to determine whether
the impact of an incident is substantial, namely (a) the num-
ber of users affected by the incident, in particular users relying
on the service for the provision of their own services; (b) the
duration of the incident; (c) the geographical spread with re-
gard to the area affected by the incident; (d) the extent of the
disruption of the functioning of the service; (e) the extent of
the impact on economic and societal activities. These param-
eters are further specified in the Implementing Regulation.36 33 The Commission shall adopt implementing acts in order to 
specify further the elements referred to in paragraph 1 and the pa- 
rameters listed in paragraph 4 of this article. Those implementing 
acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination proce- 
dure referred to in article 22(2) by 9 August 2017. 
34 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151, of 30 Jan- 
uary 2018, laying down rules for application of Directive (EU) 
2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as re- 
gards further specification of the elements to be taken into ac- 
count by digital service providers for managing the risks posed to 
the security of network and information systems and of the pa- 
rameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial 
impact. 
35 See article 2 of the Implementing Regulation. 
36 See articles 3 and 4 of the Implementing Regulation. 
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national Journal of Technology Law and Practice, https://doi.org/1This softer regulation of digital service providers in terms
of security and notification requirements is also evident in
their obligation to notify an incident only in those cases where
they have access to the information needed to assess the im-
pact of such incident.37 Furthermore, in the case of digital ser-
vice providers, contrary to operators of essential services, the
competent authorities take action, if necessary, through ex
post supervisory measures when provided with evidence by
the digital service provider itself or a user or another compe-
tent authority.38 
4. Is the different approach towards digital 
service providers and operators of essential 
services well justified? 
The Directive’s lighter approach towards digital service
providers, as far as the security and notification requirements
are concerned, as well as their ex post supervision by the com-
petent authorities, is evident throughout its text. In addition
to the Directive’s main articles, many of its recitals deal exten-
sively with the issue. Other than recital 60 mentioned above,
recital 49 points out that digital service providers should be
free to take measures they consider appropriate to manage
the risks posed to their systems.39 In the same context, recital
57 acknowledges the differences between operators of essen-
tial services and digital service providers and suggests that
Member States should not identify digital service providers
and at the same time should pursue a different level of har-
monisation in relation to those two groups of entities.40 
The softer approach towards digital service providers is
mainly based on the different nature of the infrastructures
they use as well as of the services they provide. It is not with-See also article 17 of the Directive. 
39 See recital 49 of the NIS Directive “…the security require- 
ments for digital service providers should be lighter. Digital ser- 
vice providers should remain free to take measures they consider 
appropriate to manage the risks posed to the security of their net- 
work and information systems”. 
40 See recital 49: “Given the fundamental differences between op- 
erators of essential services, in particular their direct link with 
physical infrastructure, and digital service providers, in particu- 
lar their cross-border nature, this Directive should take a differ- 
entiated approach with respect to the level of harmonisation in 
relation to those two groups of entities. For operators of essen- 
tial services, Member States should be able to identify the relevant 
operators and impose stricter requirements than those laid down 
in this Directive. Member States should not identify digital ser- 
vice providers, as this Directive should apply to all digital service 
providers within its scope”. 
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ut meaning that the term “essential” distinguishes the ser- 
ices provided by the operators of essential services – it is 
ven included in their definition. Moreover, the distinction “in 
avour” of digital service providers has an extra benefit for 
hem, as it leaves them with more freedom to conduct busi- 
ess, which is considered a key factor to their successful op- 
ration. This is also the conclusion reached by ENISA, which,
n its 2017 incident notifications for DSPs in the context of the 
IS Directive paper, observes that “In this respect, the light-touch 
pproach aims at avoiding overburdening the DSPs while not ham- 
ering the capacity of the EU to react to cybersecurity incidents in a 
wift and efficient manner”. 41 
Should however this lighter treatment ever retreats when 
pecial conditions occur? For instance, there are cases where 
perators of essential services rely on digital service providers 
o provide their services. This would be the case for example 
f a hospital (operator of essential services activated in the 
ealth sector) hosting its patient records in the cloud (digi- 
al service provider that provides cloud computing services).
hould these cases of digital service providers be treated 
ifferently? The NIS Directive, with the exception of some 
ases of national security and maintenance of law and order,
trongly discourages Member States from imposing any fur- 
her security and notification requirements on digital service 
roviders.42 However, there are several references in the text 
hat leave space for a different reading of the Directive. Recital 
4 for instance mentions that “where public administrations in 
ember States use services offered by digital service providers, in 
articular cloud computing services, they might wish to require from 
he providers of such services additional security measures beyond 
hat digital service providers would normally offer in compliance 
ith the requirements of this Directive. They should be able to do so 
y means of contractual obligations ”. Relevant reference is made 
lso in recital 56, “this Directive should not preclude Member States 
rom adopting national measures requiring public-sector bodies to 
nsure specific security requirements when they contract cloud com- 
uting services. Any such national measures should apply to the 
ublic-sector body concerned and not to the cloud computing ser- 
ice provider”. Both recitals depict the same concern, that is,
ow security obligations of digital service providers could be 
trengthened if special conditions apply. What the NIS Direc- 
ive suggests is that, if there is a need for additional security 
easures, this should be implemented contractually between 
he parties and not by means of the Directive’s provisions. At 
he same time any further national security measures should 
pply to the operators of essential services and not to digital 
ervice providers. Article 16(5) leads to the same conclusion by 
efining that the burden of notifying an incident to the com- 41 See https://www.ENISA.europa.eu/publications/ 
ncident- notification- for- dsps- in- the- context- of- the- nis- directive 
42 See article 16(10) “Without prejudice to article 1(6) member 
tates shall not impose any further security or notification re- 
uirements on digital service providers.” Article 1(6) reads as fol- 
ows: “This Directive is without prejudice to the actions taken by 
ember States to safeguard their essential state functions, in par- 
icular to safeguard national security, including actions protecting 
nformation the disclosure of which Member States consider con- 
rary to the essential interests of their security and to maintain 
aw and order, in particular to allow for the investigation, detec- 
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ervices relies on a third part digital service provider for the 
rovision of the service, stays with the operators of essential 
ervices. 
. National frameworks on the security of 
etwork and information systems: national 
trategies and national authorities (articles 7–10 
f the NIS Directive) 
ach Member State must adopt a national framework in or- 
er to succeed compliance with the provisions of the NIS Di- 
ective. The national framework includes the national strat- 
gy on the security of network and information systems and 
he designation of the authorities that shall be responsible for 
he monitoring the implementation of the NIS Directive. As 
ar as the first parameter is concerned, Article 7 of the Di- 
ective sets the obligation of each Member State to adopt a 
ational strategy on the security of network and information 
ystems in order to achieve a high level of security of such 
etworks. This national strategy must address a list of issues,
s described in article 7(1), including, among others, a risk as- 
essment plan, a governance framework to achieve the objec- 
ives of the national strategy, the identification of measures 
elating to preparedness, response and recovery etc. Member 
tates may turn to ENISA for advice and assistance when de- 
eloping their national strategies. As per article 7(3) Member 
tates ought to communicate their national strategies to the 
ommission within three months from their adoption. 
Articles 8, 9, 11 and 12 of the NIS Directive specify the au-
horities and other bodies that shall be tasked with the role of 
onitoring its application at national and EU level. Each Mem- 
er State ought to designate one or more national competent 
uthorities on the security of network and information sys- 
ems. These shall monitor the application of the NIS Directive 
t national level. Each Member State shall also designate a na- 
ional Single Point of Contact to liaise and ensure cross-border 
ooperation with other Member States. Designated competent 
uthorities and single point of contact, as well as their tasks,
hould be notified to the Commission (article 8). 
Whether national competent authorities will be qualified 
o carry out this task is a question that can only be answered in
ractice. Undoubtedly, given the technical nature of its provi- 
ions and the complexity of the procedures provided for under 
he Directive, monitoring of its application by the competent 
uthorities shall require expertise and profound technical 
nowledge. For now it suffices to say that the Directive, in its 
rticle 8 par. 5, sets Member States’ obligation to ensure that 
he competent authorities and the single points of contact 
hall have adequate technical, financial and human resources 
o carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks 
ssigned to them and thereby to fulfil the objectives of this Di- 
ective. In practice, it is anticipated that both the Cooperation 
roup and ENISA shall, based on their technical expertise,
rove useful assistants to this task. At the same time the 
uropean Commission has proposed a Regulation for the cre- 
tion of a European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and 
esearch competence Centre in an effort to invest in stronger 
nd pioneering cybersecurity capacity in the EU. Once tantinou and Paul de Hert, The new EU cybersecurity frame- 
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46 See Section 6 below: the role of ENISA in the new landscape. 
47 https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single- market/en/news/ 
nis- cooperation- group- meetings- agendas 
48 Commission implementing Decision (EU) 2017/179 of 1 Febru- 
ary 2017 laying down procedural arrangements necessary for the 
functioning of the Cooperation Group pursuant to article 11(5) of 
the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning measures for a high common level of security 
of network and information systems across the Union 
49 Among others, the decision mentions that the Cooperation established, the Competence Centre shall also contribute to
better understanding cybersecurity and reducing skills gaps
on the Union related to cybersecurity.43 
Member States are also asked to introduce one or more
computer security incident response teams CSIRTs (article 9).
The CSIRTs role, as per Annex I of the Directive, is to mon-
itor incidents at national level, provide early warning, alerts
and information to relevant stakeholders about risks and in-
cidents, respond to incidents, provide dynamic risk and inci-
dent analysis and increase situational awareness, as well as,
to participate in a network of the CSIRTs across Europe. 
The NIS Directive does not impose a structure or hier-
archy for the competent authority, the single point of con-
tact or the CSIRTs. They may form a single organisation or
be separate. Therefore, a CSIRT may be established within a
competent authority. CSIRTs shall be responsible for risk and
incident handling. As regards the relevant mechanism, all in-
cident notifications received by the competent Authority or
the CSIRTs shall be notified to the Single Point of Contact,
which, in turn, shall submit annual summary reports to the
Cooperation Group on the notifications received and the ac-
tions taken in accordance to the Directive. 
The Directive’s structure grants Member States space to de-
sign and adopt their national strategies on the security of net-
work and information systems. The Directive sets the frame-
work within which Member States should act as far as security
and notification requirements for both operators of essential
services and digital services providers are concerned. What
these particular measures and requirements will be though
rests entirely with each Member State. In view of the flexibil-
ity provided to Member States under the Directive, the first
question that comes to mind is whether harmonised imple-
mentation of the Directive’s provisions in different Member
States is feasible. 
Given that this is the first regulatory attempt at EU level
for the protection of information systems and in view of the
fact that the Directive aims to regulate a sector under con-
stant reform and development, it is the authors’ belief that
this flexibility in implementation could prove beneficial in the
long term. Allowing Member States to adapt the Directive’s
provisions to the needs and special characteristics of the un-
dertakings operating within their territory could contribute to
more effective assessment and implementation of the mea-
sures and requirements suggested in the Directive’s text. 
However, potentially diverging Member States’ approaches
is taken under consideration in the Directive’s text. To this end
a series of safeguards are introduced. More specifically, article
19 par. 1 of the Directive suggests that Member States encour-
age the use of European or internationally accepted standards
and specifications in order to promote convergent implemen-
tation. At the same time both the Commission’s Implement-
ing Regulation,44 as well as the Cooperation Group’s guidance
notes 45 are aimed towards the above purpose. ENISA’s role43 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and 
of the Council establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, 
Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of 
National Coordination Centres, COM (2018) 630 final. 
44 See footnote 35. 
45 See footnotes 25 and 26. 
Please cite this article as: Dimitra Markopoulou, Vagelis Papakons
work: The NIS Directive, ENISA’s role and the General Data Protect
national Journal of Technology Law and Practice, https://doi.org/1while assisting Member States in implementing the Directive
is also expected to contribute to the same end.46 It remains
to be seen, however, whether the above safeguards will suffice
towards a harmonised implementation of the Directive within
the EU. 
6. Cooperation at EU level: the Cooperation 
Group (article 11), the CSIRTs network (article 12) 
and the Wannacry case 
At EU level, the Cooperation Group (“CG”) established under
the NIS Directive (article 11), shall be chaired by the Presi-
dency of the Council of the European Union. It shall gather
representatives of Member States, the Commission (acting as
secretariat) and ENISA. Given the importance of international
cooperation on cybersecurity, the Group’s role is to facilitate
strategic cooperation and exchange of information among
Member States and help develop trust and confidence. The
Cooperation Group has met seven times to-date starting from
February 2017.47 The Group’s tasks are described in article
11(3). Its functioning is further clarified by the Implementing
Decision issued by the Commission, by virtue of article 11(5)
of the Directive.48 , 49 
Finally, article 12 establishes the creation of a network of
the national CSIRT’s. The CSIRTs network shall be composed
of representatives of the Member States’ CSIRTs and CERT-EU
(the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institu-
tions, agencies and bodies). Among the tasks that fall within
the CSIRTs network’s competencies is the exchange of infor-
mation on CSIRTs’ services, operations and cooperation capa-
bilities, the exchange of information related to incidents and
associated risks, identification of a coordinated response to
an incident, and provision of support to Member States in ad-
dressing cross–border incidents. The Commission participates
in the CSIRTs Network as an observer. ENISA provides sec-
retariat services, actively supporting the cooperation among
the CSIRTs. Two years after entry into force of the NIS Direc-
tive (by 9 August 2018), and every 18 months thereafter, the
CSIRTs Network will produce a report assessing the benefits
of operational cooperation, including conclusions and recom-
mendations. The report will be sent to the Commission as a
contribution to the review of the functioning of the Directive. Group operates by consensus and can set up sub-groups to ex- 
amine specific questions related to its work. The group works on 
the basis of biennial work programmes. Its main tasks are to steer 
the work of the Member States in the implementation of the Di- 
rective, by providing guidance to the CSIRTs network and assisting 
Member States in capacity building, sharing information and best 
practices on key issues, such as risks, incidents and cyber aware- 
ness. 
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The first recorded cyber security incident at EU level dates 
ack to May 2017 and refers to the WannaCry Ransomware 
ttack. The term ransomware 50 has been around for decades 
ut the WannaCry attack was the first global ransomware 
eist that impacted entire state hospital systems, interna- 
ional businesses and countries as a whole. Estimates of that 
ime suggested that approximately 190,000 computers in over 
50 countries were affected.51 This was a year in which the 
perational cooperation of the CSIRTs network was tested and 
roved its readiness and ability to cooperate during large scale 
ecurity incidents. Despite its negative impact worldwide, this 
ncident demonstrated the severity of large-scale cross border 
yberattacks and triggered the need for international cooper- 
tion.52 
. The role of ENISA in the new landscape 
NISA is the European Union Agency for Network and Infor- 
ation Security. It is located in Greece (Heraclion Crete) and 
as an operational office in Athens. ENISA was founded by 
egulation (EC) No 460/2004,53 whereas its current regulatory 
ramework consists of Regulation (EU) No 526/2013.54 Since 
004, ENISA has been actively contributing towards warrant- 
ng a high level of network and information security within 
he EU. ENISA’s mission is to raise “awareness of network and 
nformation security and to develop and promote a culture of net- 
ork and information security in society for the benefit of citi- 
ens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organisations in the 
nion ”.55 A proposal for a new Regulation on ENISA, repealing 
egulation (EU) 526/2013 and on Information and Communi- 
ation Technology cybersecurity certification (“Cybersecurity 
ct”),56 promises to reform the Agency and enhance its ca- 
abilities and capacities aiming at achieving cybersecurity re- 
ilience and better supporting Member States. In December 
018, the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
he Council of the European Union reached a political agree- 
ent on the Cybersecurity Act.57 In March 2019 the European 
arliament adopted the Cybersecurity Act.58 The Council of 50 A virus infiltrates a computer device, locks down its data and 
ould not release it until a ransom is paid. 
51 See https://www.ENISA.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/ 
annacry-ransomware-outburst 
52 See also https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack- 
kraine- russia- code- crashed- the- world/ regarding the NotPetya 
ttack. 
53 Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and 
f the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing the European Net- 
ork and Information Security Agency (Text with EEA relevance), 
s amended by Regulation (EC) No 1007/2008 and amended by Reg- 
lation (EC) No 580/2011. 
54 Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
he Council of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency 
or Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Reg- 
lation (EC) No 460/2004. 
55 See article 1 of ENISA’s Regulation (EU) 526/2013. 
56 See footnote 10. 
57 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/cybersecurity- 
ct- 2018- dec- 11 _ en 
58 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single- market/en/news/ 
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his new EU Regulation that will enter into force 20 days after 
ts publication in the EU Official Journal. 
A broad description of ENISA’s contribution to network and 
nformation security includes, among others, issuing recom- 
endations, supporting policy-making, as well as “hands-on”
ork, whereby ENISA collaborates directly with operational 
eams throughout the EU. A summary of ENISA’s strategy for 
he years 2016–2020 is being published,59 incorporating the 
ollowing priorities: (a) anticipate and support Europe in fac- 
ng emerging network and information security challenges, (b) 
romote network and information security as an EU policy pri- 
rity, (c) support Europe in maintaining state of the art NIS 
apacities, (d) foster the emerging European NIS Community,
nd (e) reinforce ENISA’s impact.60 At the same time ENISA 
ctively assists the competent authorities by appointing its 
epresentative in the Cooperation Group and by providing the 
ecretariat in the CSIRTs network.61 
As regards the NIS Directive in particular, ENISA’s role in 
mplementing its provisions is practically embedded in its 
ext. Recital 36 states that ENISA should assist Member States 
nd the Commission by providing expertise whereas both 
ember States and the Commission should be able to con- 
ult ENISA.62 Also, recital 38 refers to ENISA’s responsibility to 
ssist the Cooperation Group and be involved in the develop- 
ent of guidelines.63 Finally, according to recital 69 the Com- 
ission should consult ENISA when adopting implementing 
cts.64 ENISA’s enhanced role is also evident in several of the 
irective’s articles.65 
In practice, and as far as digital service providers are 
oncerned, ENISA has issued a report to assist Member States 
n their effort to provide a common approach regarding the 
inimum security measures for digital service providers.66 
bjectives of the report are to define common baseline 
ecurity objectives for digital service providers, to describe 
ifferent levels of sophistication in the implementation of 
ecurity objectives, as well as to map the security objectives 59 See https://www.ENISA.europa.eu/publications/corporate/ 
NISA-strategy 
60 On the role of ENISA see also Robinson N. in European Cyber Se- 
urity policy , in Andreasson K. (Ed.) Cybersecurity, Public Sector Threat 
nd Responses , Taylor & Francis Group, 2012. 
61 See article 11 par. 2 and 12 par. 2 of the NIS Directive, respec- 
ively. 
62 See recital 36 “ENISA should assist the Member States and the 
ommission by providing expertise and advice and by facilitating 
he exchange of best practice. In particular, in the application of 
his Directive, the Commission should, and Member States should 
e able to, consult ENISA. 
63 See recital 38 “In general, ENISA should assist the Cooperation 
roup in the execution of its tasks…ENISA should also be involved 
n the development of guidelines for sector-specific criteria for de- 
ermining the significance of the impact of an incident”. 
64 See recital 69 “When adopting implementing acts on the se- 
urity requirements for digital service providers, the Commission 
hould take the utmost account of the opinion of ENISA”. 
65 See for instance article 5 par. 7, article 7 par. 2, article 9 par. 5, 
rticle 12, article 19. 
66 See https://www.ENISA.europa.eu/publications/minimum- 
ecurity- measures- for- digital- service- providers 
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71 See article 1 of the GDPR. 
72 See Preamble par. 73 of the NIS Directive. 
73 Admittedly, the NIS Directive does refer to the Data Protection 
Directive (Directive 95/46) that the GDPR replaced, in its Article against well-known industry standards, national frameworks
and certification schemes. 
In addition, ENISA has published another set of guidelines
to further describe the incident notification process imposed
on digital service providers as per article 16 of the NIS Direc-
tive.67 Their objective, as stated in their par. 1.1, is “to develop
a set of guidelines for all concerned stakeholders (EU level authori-
ties, public, private), aimed at supporting the implementation of the
NIS Directive (hereafter referred to as “the Directive” or “NISD”) re-
quirements regarding mandatory incident notification ”. The guide-
lines significantly contribute to further elaborating and clar-
ifying notions that are included in the Directive’s text, such
as the “incidents” that fall within the notification obligation,
the term “substantial impact” as well as the “parameters” that
must be taken into account when determining the impact of
an incident, as these are included in article 16(4) of the NIS
Directive (number of users, duration of incident, geographical
spread, extent of disruption and extent of impact on economic
and societal activities). 
The EU has already undertaken actions in order to enhance
ENISA’s role in ensuring a high level of network and infor-
mation security, as well as in assisting Member States to im-
plement an efficient national security policy for this purpose.
Since its establishment in 2004, ENISA has been designated
as a significant player in the cybersecurity industry. The NIS
Directive further specified ENISA’s powers and tasks and at-
tributed to the Agency a key role as far as implementation of
the Directive is concerned. An issue that remains unaddressed
until today however, and which hopefully will be regulated by
the new Regulation on ENISA,68 is that ENISA remains the only
EU agency with a fixed-term mandate. As pointed out in the
Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation on
ENISA, this limits its ability to develop a long-term vision and
support its stakeholders in a sustainable manner. 
The fixed-term mandate also contrasts with the provisions
of the Directive, which entrust ENISA with tasks with no end
date. Under the Proposal, ENISA would be granted a perma-
nent mandate and thus be put on a stable footing for the fu-
ture.69 This reform, in combination with the EU general ICT
cybersecurity certification framework,70 is considered as the
preferred option in order for the EU to reach its objectives as
far as its response to cybersecurity challenges is concerned. 
In addition to the mandate amendment, the proposed reg-
ulation introduces some other novelties. In more detail it pro-
vides, among others, for an independent agency, that shall be
named the “EU Cybersecurity Agency” and which shall oper-
ate as a centre of expertise on cybersecurity, shall assist the
Union institutions, agencies and bodies, shall support capac-
ity building and preparedness across the Union, shall promote
cooperation across the Union and shall promote the use of cer-67 See https://www.ENISA.europa.eu/publications/incident- 
notification- for- dsps- in- the- context- of- the- nis- directive 
68 See the Proposal for a Regulation as cited in recital 51 above. 
69 See the explanatory memorandum of the Proposal for a Regula- 
tion on ENISA at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/ 
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0477&from=EN . 
70 The draft Proposal also outlines a cybersecurity certification 
scheme and the creation of the EU cybersecurity certification 
group (Articles 43-54 of the Proposal). 
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rity certification framework at Union level. In light of the con-
tinually evolving cyber threats and large-scale cross-border
cybersecurity incidents, new enhanced role of ENISA’s is ur-
gently needed. 
8. The NIS Directive and the General Data 
Protection Regulation 
The General Data Protection Regulation, that became appli-
cable on 25 May 2018, is aimed at protecting individuals with
regard to the processing of their personal data, as well as, war-
ranting the free movement of such data within the EU.71 Re-
lease of the two legal instruments, the NIS Directive and the
GDPR, largely coincided, the NIS Directive being published on
July 2016 and the GDPR in April of the same year. However,
the two law-making processes took place independently and
in parallel, without much attention being paid from one to the
other. Their only interaction was noted as early as in June 2013,
in the form of an opinion issued by the EDPS on the NIS Direc-
tive.72 
Neither the NIS Directive nor the GDPR acknowledges each
other in their respective texts.73 The NIS Directive only takes
passing, if not limited, interest in data protection, in its article
2 or, for example, when mentioning that it “respects the funda-
mental rights, and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right
to respect for private life and communications, the protection of per-
sonal data, […] ”,74 or, by asking that competent authorities and
DPAs cooperate whenever personal data are compromised in
the event of incidents.75 From its part, the GDPR takes account
of cybersecurity-related processing only for its own aims and
purposes, for example when clarifying that “processing of per-
sonal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the
purposes of ensuring network and information security constitutes
a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned ”, also listing
CERTs and CSIRTs among recipients of these clarifications.76 
In the same context, that of examining the relationship
between the NIS Directive and the EU data protection sys-
tem, some relevance may be found between the NIS Direc-
tive and the ePrivacy legal framework.77 Notwithstanding the
fact that the ePrivacy legal framework is sometimes broader
than that of the GDPR, because privacy and confidentiality of2, in however a passing, already outdated (the GDPR was already 
published) and mostly uninterested manner: “processing of personal 
data pursuant to this Directive shall be carried out in accordance with Di- 
rective 95/46/EC ”. 
74 See Preamble, par. 75. 
75 See article 15.4 and par. 63 of the Preamble. 
76 See Preamble 49. 
77 As set, today, by the ePrivacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 con- 
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of pri- 
vacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy 
and electronic communications, as amended and in effect today). 
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ommunications are explicitly listed within its scope, the def- 
nition of “network and information systems ” in the NIS Direc- 
ive explicitly includes “electronic communications networks ” in 
he ePrivacy context,78 thus invoking parallel application of 
he two legal instruments in relevant occasions. This in turn 
reates legal difficulties, not only because the ePrivacy EU le- 
al framework is currently under review that will not become 
nal in the near future,79 but also because the relationship be- 
ween the ePrivacy legal framework and the GDPR itself is at 
imes problematic.80 
Nevertheless, lack of explicit acknowledgement does not 
ean that the NIS Directive and the GDPR are unrelated.81 
n the contrary, as long as network and information systems 
re used for the processing of personal data, both legal instru- 
ents find application at the same time. It is therefore impor- 
ant first to identify points of interaction and then to discuss 
hat happens in the event of conflicts. 
As regards the former, points of interaction between the 
DPR and the NIS Directive may occur whenever personal 
ata are found in the systems of digital service providers 
nd/or operators of essential services. An obvious first such 
oint refers to the security of (personal) information. The 
rinciple of security of the personal data is one of the basic 
rinciples of the GDPR. While a relevant analysis exceeds the 
urposes of this paper, here it is enough to be noted that,
ccording to the principle of integrity and confidentiality,
personal data should be processed in a manner that ensures ap- 
ropriate security of the personal data, including protection against 
nauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss,
estruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisa- 
ional measures ”.82 This is made concrete for controllers and 
rocessors in various provisions of the GDPR, most notably in 
 specialised article, article 32, but also while keeping records 
f their processing activities (Art. 30), while notifying data 
reaches (Art. 33), while preparing their impact assessments 
Art. 35) or codes of conduct (Art. 40), or even when assessing 
he adequacy of the level of protection in a third country in 
nternational transfers (Art. 45). 
The obvious question in this case is whether security mea- 
ures undertaken in the context of the NIS Directive should 
e considered sufficient in the context of the GDPR, and 
ice versa. However, although this may be an expected and 
easonable question on behalf of controllers and processors,
r digital service providers and operators of essential services 
espectively, who would presumably wish to organise their 78 See article 4.1(a) of the Directive. 
79 Currently, the ePrivacy Regulation (COM 2017/10/final) is found 
t the trilogue EU law-making stage, most likely to be finalised in 
arly 2019, which in turn means that a period of a few years until 
t becomes fully effective in the EU. 
80 The general idea being that the ePrivacy legal framework “com- 
lements and particularises” the GDPR, without this avoiding that 
ases of ambiguity altogether. See also European Data Protection 
oard, Opinion 5/2019 on the interplay between the ePrivacy Direc- 
ive and the GDPR, in particular regarding the competence, tasks 
nd powers of data protection authorities (12 March 2019). 
81 See also Kuner C/Svantesson D/Cate F/Lynskey O/Millard C in 
he rise of cybersecurity and its impact on data protection , editorial, 
nternational Data Privacy Law, Volume 7, Issue 2, 1 May 2017. 
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ider it difficult for it to be answered in abstracto . Compliance 
bligations under each legal instrument are to be assessed 
eparately, for different purposes, under different contexts,
nd indeed by different authorities. There is no apparent legal 
eason for decisions reached under one context to be consid- 
red binding under the other. Administrative fines or other 
nforcement measures, for the same purposes, should be con- 
idered cumulative and not mutually exclusive. Regardless 
f the fact that the practical network security measures may 
e the same for both legal instruments, we consider it es- 
ential that they be listed separately, in each compliance 
ocumentation respectively, and, in the event of a breach or 
ncident, that they be judged independently, each for its own 
erits under the given circumstances and applicable legal 
ramework. 
Another point of interaction between the EU data protec- 
ion and the EU cybersecurity legal systems could refer to an 
nformation systems’ breach that would invite both an inci- 
ent notification under the NIS Directive 83 and a data breach 
otification under the GDPR.84 Could the two co-incide, or 
ould a provider have to duplicate its effort so as to sat- 
sfy both legal instruments separately? 85 Here too the authors 
elieve that an answer cannot be provided in abstracto , but 
ould have to take into account the particular breach circum- 
tances each time. In principle, however, again the two proce- 
ures should be considered unrelated and given the different 
ubject-matter of the GDPR and the NIS Directive respectively,
roviders will most likely have to notify separately, each time 
nder the requirements of each legal act. 
As regards any cases of conflict between the NIS Directive 
nd the GDPR, while in principle any scope overlaps ought to 
e resolved through a lex specialis/lex generalis relationship,86 in 
he event of conflict, the GDPR will have to prevail. This is the
esult of both the GDPR implementing article 16(2) TFEU 87 as 
ell as the presumed relationship between the applicable le- 
al instruments each time. As regards the former, Article 16(2) 
FEU added the right to data protection to the list of funda- 
ental EU rights; 88 Consequently, respect of the right to data 
rotection, as particularised in the text of the GDPR, consti- 
utes a horizontal legal obligation within the EU and if these 
wo obligations, meaning protection of personal data and cy- 
ersecurity, ever need to be balanced, the former will have 
o prevail.89 This finding is further strengthened if the nature 83 See its Article 14. 
84 See its Article 33. 
85 On this issue see the UK ICO’s guidance on “The GDPR 
nd NIS” ( https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/the-guide-to-nis/ 
dpr- and- nis/ ) and also ENISA’s “Incident notification for DSPs in 
he context of the NIS Directive”, February 2017, p.20. 
86 Perhaps also in the spirit of article 2 of the NIS Directive. 
87 See also Preamble par. (1) and (12) of the GDPR. 
88 In its par. 1. 
89 See in particular the Breyer decision (CJEU, Patrick Breyer v Bun- 
esrepublik Deutschland , Case C-582/14, par. 63 and 64), whereby 
he processing of personal data for security purposes (retention 
f the IP addresses of website visitors long after they had con- 
luded their visit onto the respective websites) undertaken by in- 
ernet site operators for prevention of security breaches (for exam- 
le, “denial-of-service” attacks) was found to be falling under the 
tantinou and Paul de Hert, The new EU cybersecurity frame- 
ion Regulation, Computer Law & Security Review: The Inter- 
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of potentially conflicting legal instruments is taken into con-
sideration: The NIS Directive being implemented by national
law at Member State level, a potential future conflict would
therefore include an EU Regulation (the GDPR) against a Mem-
ber State law, whereby the former would normally take prece-
dence.90 
When would any such conflict between the GDPR and the
NIS Directive occur? For example, a Member State could de-
cide to permit personal data processing operations otherwise
prohibited or strictly regulated under the GDPR as part of
its cybersecurity strategy, e.g. profiling on the basis of spe-
cial categories of data (IP addresses coming from regions with
high concentration of ethnic or religious populations) without
the safeguards of article 22 of the GDPR. Or, an essential ser-
vices provider could decide to store personal data for the pur-
poses of cybersecurity for much longer than needed under the
GDPR’s principle of data minimisation. 
Evidently, conflicting obligations are by no means expected
to be the norm, and in fact the two legal instruments ought to
be viewed rather as complementary, ultimately pursuing the
same aim of (among others) strengthening the Internal Mar-
ket.91 In essence, obligations placed by the NIS Directive upon
its recipients are expected to work to the benefit of individ-
uals, whose personal data may be processed by the systems
placed under its scope. 
9. Conclusion 
The NIS Directive could be considered a late response to an
already exacerbated and well-known problem.92 By now cy-
bersecurity incidents, in the form of cyber-attacks and even
cyber warfare have not only been identified at expert level
but have also frequently captured public attention and press
frontpages. An EU response, in the form of the NIS Directive,
was long overdue in view of the many EU values at stake. How-
ever, the fact that a Directive allows Member States both space
for flexibility and time for repose could be viewed as counter-“legitimate interests of the controller” legal basis, and was thus 
allowed by the Court, despite national (German) legislation pro- 
hibiting it. Consequently, in practice whenever personal data are 
being processed for (cyber)security purposes a balancing needs to 
be made, however at all times within the GDPR limits and bound- 
aries. For example, while the mere retention of the IP addresses 
as above was deemed lawful by the Court under the “legitimate 
interests of the controller” legal basis, such conclusion ought not 
be taken for granted if more intrusive security-related processing 
was performed upon the same data (e.g. continuous on-line cross- 
examination against police databases in order to identify visits 
by known criminals). In other words, the balancing and assess- 
ment of the data protection and cybersecurity interests will always 
take place within GDPR and not NIS Directive grounds, giving thus 
precedence to the mechanism of the former. 
90 See also Preamble of the NIS Directive, par. 75. 
91 See Preamble par. 2 of the GDPR and Preamble par. 3 of the NIS 
Directive. See also Schünemann W/Baumann M-O (Eds.), Privacy, 
Data Protection and Cybersecurity in Europe, Springer, 2017. 
92 See also Carrapico H./Barrinha A. in The EU as a Coherent (Cy- 
ber)Security Actor?, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 6 
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area of, indeed, cybersecurity. 
Notwithstanding the choice of legal instrument, EU’s re-
sponse offers a well-thought of and balanced response that
takes into account the (cybersecurity) problem and plans for
the future. It establishes new, permanent, competent authori-
ties at Member State level and introduces a system of cross-EU
cooperation. National sensitivities and even budget restraints,
as well as different levels of information technology sophisti-
cation, are also taken into account in the text of the NIS Di-
rective, in the sense that it grants Member States room for
manoeuvre (this time the choice of legal instrument playing
in its favour rather than against it). OESs are evidently placed
at the epicentre of attention, as was expected to be the case
given their critical services. The DSPs that carry concrete com-
pliance obligations under the NIS Directive are active today in
these business sectors that, at least in contemporary business
circumstances, are generally expected to have the financial
means and human resources to successfully meet the chal-
lenge. ENISA’s role is correctly strengthened – and is only ex-
pected to increase in importance in the future. 
The NIS Directive’s relationship with the GDPR, and the
broader EU data protection edifice, has indeed attracted some
attention and discussion, however we believe that this is
mostly unwarranted. Each legal framework has its own aims
and purposes and establishes its own mechanisms to achieve
them. Their perspective also differs substantially: cyberse-
curity, unlike data protection, essentially does not grant any
rights to individuals. Notwithstanding therefore the contem-
porary GDPR prevalence and ever-presence on all things digi-
tal, we believe that even on the few issues where the two legal
frameworks intersect, one ought to leave the other largely un-
affected, each security measure, personal data breach or inci-
dent being judged separately under its own circumstances. 
Finally, it is important that one keeps the global perspective
in mind. Cybersecurity is a critical field of global regulatory
interest. China has introduced since 2017 its own cybersecu-
rity law, which attracted various responses in the EU and else-
where. The USA is implementing its own cybersecurity policy.
The issue of data localisation,93 that gravely affects any cyber-
security strategy, is being heatedly contested across the globe.
The NIS Directive ought to be perceived as a single piece in a
large, international, puzzle, perhaps the first EU piece in the
game, hopefully soon to be followed, complemented and par-
ticularised by many others. 
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